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I. INTRODUCTION
School Board of Nassau County, Florida v. Arline 1 represents the Supreme
Court's first encounter with the previously uncharted area of law concerning
the discriminatory treatment of individuals afflicted with contagious diseases.
Although the decision appears, at first blush, to be a mere extension of previ-
1. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
ous case law interpreting the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 2 closer scrutiny of
the decision indicates that the Court has broadened the scope of the Act by in-
cluding contagious diseases within the ambit of the Act's protection.
Although Arline may present strong precedent for all victims of contagious
diseases, this note will primarily focus on the possible legal ramifications of
the decision upon the narrower class of individuals, those infected with Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). In particular, the focus will be on whether
the Arline decision will shield AIDS victims from discriminatory treatment by
bringing these individuals within the protection of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
or whether the decision will be used as a sword, severing AIDS victims' hopes
for equal employment opportunities.
II. FACTS
In 1957, Gene Arline 3 was hospitalized and diagnosed as having tubercu-
losis. 4 The disease eventually went into remission, and in 1966, Arline began
teaching elementary school in Nassau County, Florida. I The disease remained
inactive for twenty years, until 1977, when a culture revealed the recurrence
of active tuberculosis in her system. I Arline suffered an additional relapse in
the spring of 1978.7 In November of the same year, Arline sustained a third
relapse and was subsequently suspended from her position as an elementary
school teacher, with pay, for the remainder of the school year. 8 At the end
of the 1978-79 school year, the school board met and voted to permanently
discharge Arline. 9 The school board stated that Arline's termination was a direct
result of the repeated occurrence of tuberculosis. 10
After Arline was denied relief in state administrative proceedings, she
brought suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Flori-
da, alleging that the school board had violated section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973. 11 Section 504 prohibits a federally funded state program from
discriminating against "otherwise qualified handicapped individuals" solely by
reason of their handicap. The district court held that Arline was not a "han-
2. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
3. Respondent in this action. Id.







11. Id. at 277. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 reads in relevant part as follows: "No
otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as defined in section 706(7) of this title,
shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subject to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance .... 29 U.S.C.
§ 794 (1982). Arline, 480 U.S. at 278.
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dicapped person" under the guidelines set forth in the statute, 12 and that even
if Arline's condition had invoked the Act's protection, she was not "otherwise
qualified" to teach elementary school. 13 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit reversed, holding that contagious diseases, such as Arline's, fall "neat-
ly within the statutory and regulatory framework" of section 504. 14 That court
remanded the case for a determination of whether Arline was "otherwise quali-
fied" to teach elementary school, and if so, whether the job could be reasona-
bly modified to accommodate her limitations. 15
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the deci-
sion of the Court of Appeals. 16 The Court concluded that a person infected
with a contagious disease, such as tuberculosis, may be considered a "handicapped
individual" within the meaning of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973. 17 As to whether Arline was "otherwise qualified" to teach elementary
school, the Court stated that the district court's findings were insufficient to
enable it to draw a rational conclusion. Therefore, the Court remanded the case
for additional findings of fact. 18
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
In order to evaluate the Supreme Court's decision in Arline, it is necessary
to understand the purpose and history of the Rehabilitation Act. This section
will discuss the Rehabilitation Act's legislative history and subsequent judicial
interpretations of the Act.
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was implemented to proscribe discrimina-
tion against handicapped individuals in federally administered programs or pro-
grams receiving federal financial assistance. To invoke the protection of the
Rehabilitation Act the individual must be an "otherwise qualified handicapped
individual" and be discriminated against "solely by reason of the handicap." 19
As stated by the United States Supreme Court in North Haven Board of
Education v. Bell,2" "[o]ur starting point in determining the scope of [section
504] is, of course, the statutory language." Therefore, this section will first ex-
plore the statutory interpretations and legislative history of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973.
When the Rehabilitation Act was first promulgated in 1973, Congress nar-
rowly restricted the definition of "handicapped individual" by applying that label





17. Id. at 284-86.
18. Id. at 287-89.
19. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
20. 456 U.S. 512, 520 (1982).
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only to those persons who had a physical or mental impairment which resulted
in a substantial handicap to employment and who reasonably could be expected
to benefit from vocational rehabilitation. 21 The legislation as enacted did not
mention diseases, contagious or otherwise, despite the fact that during the Con-
gressional debate which preceded the enactment, several Congressmen spoke
of the discrimination suffered by individuals infected with such diseases as
cerebral palsy 22 and arthritis. 23
Before concluding that Congress intended to exclude contagious diseases
from the Act's protection, certain considerations should be explored. First, just
as the framers of the United States Constitution omitted a Bill of Rights from
the original body of the Constitution for fear that enumerating certain rights
would inevitably lead to the exclusion of others, the drafters of the Rehabilita-
tion Act could have omitted contagious diseases for the same reason. An all-
inclusive list of communicable diseases would be very cumbersome to assimi-
late, and would unavoidably omit some diseases. On the other hand, inclusioh
in the statute of a generic term such as "contagious diseases" would encompass
too wide an array of conditions to guide implementation. 24 Secondly, the drafters
of the Act may simply have overlooked the necessity for expressly including
an individual infected with a contagious disease within the statute's protection.
It would be fair to assume that it was not until 1981,25 when the first cases
of AIDS were reported in this country, that this generation became so aware
of the prejudicial effects of a contagious condition. While the legislative histo-
ry does not yield a definitive answer, the intent of Congress may not have been
to exclude contagious diseases from the Rehabilitation Act's protection.
One year after the passage of the Act, Congress, perhaps noting the obvi-
ous limitations of the Act as it was originally drafted, redefined the class of
21. A "handicapped individual" was originally defined as: "any individual who (A) has a physical or
mental disability which for such individual constitutes or results in a substantial handicap in employment
and (B) can reasonably be expected to benefit in terms of employability from vocational rehabilitation serv-
ices provided pursuant to Titles I and III of this Act." Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, §
7(6) t. 355, 361 (1973)
22. 117 CONG. REC. 45,974 (1971). Senator Vanik stated that: "In one case a court ruled that a cerebral
palsied child, who was not a physical threat and was academically competitive, should be excluded from
public school, because his teacher claimed his physical appearance 'produced a nauseating effect' on his class-
mates." Id. See also Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1985) (grand mal epilepsy); Bentivegna
v. United States Dep't of Labor, 694 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1982) (diabetes); Prewitt v. United States Postal
Serv., 662 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981) (shoulder injury); Simon v. St. Louis County, Mo., 656 F.2d 316 (8th
Cir. 1981) (paraplegic).
23. 118 CONG. REC. 36,761 (1972). But see De la Torres v. Bolger, 610 F. Supp. 593 (N.D. Tex. 1985),
affid, 781 F.2d 1134 (5th Cir. 1986) (left-handedness); Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244
(6th Cir. 1985) (crossed-eyes); Pridemore v. Rural Legal Aid Soc'y of West Cent. Ohio, 625 F. Supp. 1180
(S.D. Ohio 1985) ("borderline" cerebral palsy); Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739 (C.D. Cal.
1984) (excessive weight).
24. See generally J. KENT, M. HART & T. SHIREs, INTRODUCTION TO HUMAN DISEASE 346 (1979) (dis-
cussing the epidemiology of tuberculosis).
25. Pankau, AIDS: Responding to the Issues, 3 HEALTH LAWYER 1 (Fall 1987).
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persons who would be considered "handicapped individuals" under the Act. The
new definition characterizes a "handicapped individual" as "any person who (i)
has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of
such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such impairment, or (iii)
is regarded as having such an impairment." 26  This reformation is a strong
indication that Congress realized the limitations of the original definition, and
attempted to resolve the inadequacy by broadening the statute's protective cover-
age. Senator Cranston, who introduced the 1974 revision, stated that the recon-
structed statute was enacted to "prevent discrimination against all handicapped
individuals, regardless of their need for, or ability to benefit from, vocational
rehabilitation services .. -27 Cranston further indicated that the revised legis-
lation was meant to include a broader group of handicapped individuals who
suffer from discrimination even though their handicap may not affect their work
or may no longer even exist. 28 Under the revised statute, all persons who ex-
perience discrimination because of a disability, whether the handicap is actual
or perceived, may benefit from the protective umbrella of the Act. 29 Thus,
it is justifiable to ascribe to Congress the intent to include individuals with con-
tagious diseases within the definition of "handicapped individual." 3"
As discussed previously, the statutory definition of "handicapped individual"
includes any individual who falls into one of three categories.31 In order to
better determine whether a contagious disease qualifies as a handicap under one
of these categories, each will be discussed separately.
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) (formerly the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare) and the Department of Labor's Office
of Federal Contract Compliance Program (OFCCP) are responsible for further
defining the term "handicap." 2 Congress instructed HHS to implement sec-
tion 504 and OFCCP to implement section 503. 13 Although the agencies' regu-
lations differ in some respects, Congress intended that the two sections be viewed
26. Pub. L. No. 93-516, § 111(a), 88 Stat. 1619 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B)(1982)).
27. 120 CoNG. REC. 30,534 (1974). See also Amici Curiae Brief of Senators Cranston, Et. Al. and of
Representatives Atkins, Et. Al. at 30, School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987)
(No. 85-1277).
28. 120 CONG. REc. at 30,531. See also, Amnici Curiae Brief of Senators Cranston, Et. Al. and of Represen-
tatives Atkins, Et. Al. at 30, School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987) (No. 85-1277).
29. Id. at 30,534. See also E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1097-98 (D. Haw. 1980).
30. See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
31. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
32. In 1974, when Congress amended the Rehabilitation Act, it stated:
Executive order No. 11758, section 2, delegates to the Secretary of Labor the responsibility for car-
rying out the responsibilities embodied in Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and a simi-
lar delegation of responsibility to the Secretary of HEW is urged to carry out on a Government-wide
basis those responsibilities embodied in Section 504.
S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 40, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6373, 6391.
33. Shumaker, Aids: Does It Qualify as a 7Handicap" Under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973?, 61 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 572, 582 (1986).
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together when attempting to unravel section 706(7)(B)'s definition of a
"handicapped individual."34
A. Physical or Mental Impairment Which Substantially Limits
One or More of Such Person's Major Life Activities
1. Physical or Mental Impairment
The HHS regulations define, for the purpose of the Rehabilitation Act, a
"physical or mental impairment" as:
(A) any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatom-
ical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological; mus-
culoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs; cardio-
vascular; reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and
endocrine; or (B) any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retarda-
tion, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning
disabilities. 11
In Arline, the contagious disease at issue was tuberculosis. Tuberculosis, as
the Court held, would be a physical or mental impairment in that it directly
affects the respiratory system. The AIDS virus, as will be discussed in a later
section, compromises the human body's ability to defend against various op-
portunistic infections. 36 In this regard, it is also correct to state that the AIDS
virus "affect[s] one or more" of the listed body systems. The conspicuous ab-
sence of "contagious diseases" from the previously mentioned list could be seized
upon to challenge Congress' intent to include such conditions within the an-
tidiscrimination provisions of the Act. The HHS comments which pertain to
this section of the definition of "handicapped individual," however, state that
"[tihe definition does not set forth a list of specific diseases and conditions that
constitute physical or mental impairments because of the difficulty of ensuring
the comprehensiveness of any such list."
'37
2. Substantially Limits
The fact that a contagious disease fits within the definition of "physical or
mental impairment" does not alone bring the disease within the protection of
34. Id. at 582 n.69. Congress, when enacting the 1974 revised definition, stated that:
It is intended that sections 503 and 504 be administered in such a manner that a consistent, uniform,
and effective Federal approach to discrimination against handicapped persons would result. Thus,
Federal agencies and departments should cooperate in developing standards and policies so that there
is a uniform, consistent Federal approach to these sections.
H. R. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 40, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6391,
6391.
35. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i)(1985).
36. See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
37. 45 C.F.R. app. A § 84.3 (j)(2)(i)(1987).
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the Rehabilitation Act. In order to invoke the Act's protection from employ-
ment discrimination, the impairment must also be a substantial limitation on
the victim's major life activities. The OFCCP states that an individual is sub-
stantially limited if "he or she is likely to experience difficulty in securing, re-
taining or advancing in employment because of a handicap. ' 38 However, the
regulations set out by the OFCCP in the appendix add the phrase "real or per-
ceived" to the above definition of handicap. 39 This indicates that the OFCCP
intends for the definition of "substantially limits" to be construed broadly.
The Arline Court also appeared to read the definition broadly. The Court
recognized the ability of a contagious condition to substantially limit an individu-
al's employment pursuits, regardless of whether there is an actual physical im-
pairment. The Court stated that an impairment "might not diminish a person's
physical or mental capabilities, but could nevertheless substantially limit that
person's ability to work as a result of the negative reactions of others to the impair-
ment."4" This statement indicates that the United States Supreme Court may
be willing to recognize the discrimination against all contagious disease vic-
tims as constituting a "physical or mental handicap which substantially limits"
their employment opportunities.
3. Major Life Activities
The HHS defines "major life activities" as: "[C]aring for one's self, per-
forming manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learn-
ing, and working."41 The OFCCP regulation is very similar to the above
definition; however, it appears to expand the HHS definition slightly. The
OFCCP views "major life activities" as: "communication, ambulation, selfcare,
socialization, education, vocational training, employment, transportation, adapt-
ing to housing, etc." 42
B. Has A Record Of Such Impairment
According to the HHS, an individual who "has a history of, or has been
misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits
one or more major life activities," will be sheltered from employment discrimi-
nation by the Rehabilitation Act as a "handicapped individual."43
38. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.2 (1987).
39. 41 C.F.R. app. § 60-1.3 (1987).
40. Arline, 480 U.S. at 283.
41. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1987).
42. 41 C.F.R. app. A § 60-741(1987).
43. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(iii) (1987).
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C. Is Regarded As Having Such An Impairment
The HHS states that a person who "is regarded as having an impairment"
must have:
(A) a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life
activities but is treated by a recipient as constituting such a limitation; (B) has
a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life activities only
as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment; or (C) has none
of the impairments defined in paragraph (j)(2)(i) of this section but is treated by
a recipient as having such an impairment."
This section of the "handicapped individual" definition may prove to be the most
appropriate haven for individuals infected with a contagious disease. Many vic-
tims of contagious conditions exhibit no outward symptoms, and are not physi-
cally or mentally limited in their ability to function. However, if the person
is known by others to be contagious, he or she may nevertheless, be substan-
tially limited in the employment market by the unwarranted fear of employers.
Congressman Vanik, while introducing the predecessor bill to section 504 to
the House of Representatives in 1971, voiced concern over this issue." He
noted several ways in which handicapped persons may be subjected to discrimi-
nation, recognizing that stereotyped views about their ability to function properly
was a major obstacle.46 However, Congressman Vanik also noted that various
baseless fears about safety presented additional discrimination problems. 17
After examining the various statutory definitions pertaining to the Rehabili-
tation Act, it becomes apparent that in many instances these regulations are not
as helpful as Congress intended for them to be. The ambiguity inherent in each
of the definitions becomes illuminated in light of the inconsistent meanings to
which some of the drafting legislators have attached to them. Therefore, the
definitions as presently drafted may be interpreted either to include or to exclude
such contagious diseases as the AIDS virus. Furthermore, the legislative histo-
ry offers little insight into the problem. Unless the question whether to include
AIDS victims within the antidiscrimination provisions of the Act is to be left
to each judge's individual interpretation of the statute, the legislation should
be updated and clarified to meet the changing needs of modern society.
IV. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
Since the Rehabilitation Act was first promulgated in 1973, courts have
44. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(iv) (1987).
45. 117 CONG. REC. 45,974 (Dec. 9, 1971). See also Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 296 (1985).
(Rep. Vanik described the treatment of handicapped persons as one of the country's "shameful oversights,"
and stated that these individuals have been "shunted aside, hidden, and ignored.").
46. 117 CONG. REC. 45,974 (1971). See also Amici Curiae Brief of Senators Cranston, Et. Al. and
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attempted to unravel the phrase "otherwise qualified handicapped individual."
This section will review prior judicial interpretations of the Rehabilitation Act
in order to determine whether the victims of contagious diseases qualify for
protection as "otherwise qualified handicapped individuals."
The Rehabilitation Act's definition of "handicapped individual" has been
construed by only a handful of federal courts. However, in E.E. Black, Ltd.
v. Marshall, 48 the district court of Hawaii addressed, for the first time, the
issue of what constitutes a "handicapped individual."
In Black, the complainant, Mr. Crosby, was a member of a carpentry ap-
prenticeship program which taught basic carpentry skills necessary to become
a journeyman carpenter; the job required considerable bending and lifting of
heavy objects. 49 When a prospective employer, E. E. Black, required him to
take a pre-employment physical, the exam revealed that he suffered from a
congenital back disorder. so E.E. Black rejected Mr. Crosby's application for
employment, due to the possibility that his condition could lead to future
injury."1 Mr. Crosby filed an action against E.E. Black, alleging a violation
of section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act. In a 1978 hearing, the administrative
law judge dismissed the complaint in its entirety concluding that Mr. Crosby
was not a "handicapped individual." 2 The Assistant Secretary of Labor over-
ruled the administrative decision, and E.E. Black filed an action in the United
States District Court of Hawaii. The district court rejected E.E. Black's argu-
ment that Congress intended to "limit the benefits of the Act to those handicapped
individuals who encounter substantial difficulty in obtaining employment gener-
ally and did not intend to protect job applicants who are denied a particular
job because of a perceived impairment or because of the risk of future inju-
ry.", 3 The court found that since E.E. Black had refused employment to Mr.
Crosby due to a perceived handicap he was regarded as impaired, and there-
fore handicapped, in terms of employability. The district court interpreted the
term impairment to mean "any condition which weakens, diminishes, restricts,
or otherwise damages an individual's health or physical or mental activity." 4
The Arline decision indicates that the United States Supreme Court will also
read these terms broadly, so as to effectuate the purpose of the Act. Clearly,
a contagious disease would fall within the definition of impairment set forth
by the Black court.
The Black court then analyzed the term "substantial handicap to employ-
48. 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Haw. 1980).
49. Id. at 1091.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Chief Administrative Law Judge H. Stephan Gordon stated that the term "impairment" is nowhere
defined in the Act. However, he interpreted it to mean "any condition which weakens, diminishes, restricts,
or otherwise damages an individual's health or physical or mental activity." Id. at 1093.
53. Id. at 1096-97.
54. Id. at 1102.
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ment." The court stated that the real focus must be on the individual job seeker
rather than on the actual or perceived impairment. The determination of what
constitutes a substantial handicap must be decided on a "case-by-case" basis,
considering "whether the impairment, or perceived impairment, rejected, quali-
fied job seeker, constitutes, for that individual, a substantial handicap to em-
ployment." 15  Under the Black court's interpretation, primarily because of the
fear of contagion, an individual known to be infected with a communicable dis-
ease would be substantially limited as to employability, and would qualify as
a "handicapped individual." Again, the Arline Court appeared to acquiesce in
such a broad reading of "handicapped individual."
If contagious diseases are a handicap under the Rehabilitation Act, the next
issue is whether the victims of such diseases are "otherwise qualified." To be
protected by the Rehabilitation Act, a handicapped individual must also be "other-
wise qualified." The seminal Supreme Court case addressing this issue was
Southeastern Community College v. Davis. "
In Davis, the Court applied section 504 to the claim of a hearing-impaired
person who sought to be trained as a registered nurse. 51 A medical exam rev-
ealed that Davis had a "bilateral sensorineural hearing loss," and Southeastern
College, a federally funded state institution, subsequently refused her admis-
sion into its nursing school .5 8 The college determined that Davis' disability
was so profound that, even with a hearing aid, she would be unable to safely
and adequately participate in the program. 5' The Supreme Court held that the
college's determination that Davis was not "otherwise qualified" for participa-
tion in its professional program was not a violation of section 504. 60 The Court
decided that an "otherwise qualified" person is "one who is able to meet all of
a program's requirements in spite of his handicap." 6 Davis argued that sec-
tion 504 required the college to alter the program to accommodate her disabili-
ties. The Court rejected Davis' argument, stating that section 504 did not require
55. "However, what is to be considered a similar job must be made on a case-by-case basis, and may
differ among individuals with similar impairments, depending on their training, education, etc." Black, 497
F. Supp. at 1101.
56. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
57. Id. at 401.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 414. Contra Drennon v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (denial
of complainant's application for employment as a hospital technician because of epilepsy held to be a viola-
tion of section 504).
61. Davis, 442 U.S. at 406. See also Cook v. United States Dep't of Labor, 688 F.2d 669 (9th Cir.
1982) (court summarily concluded that angina pectoris would render complainant not "otherwise qualified"
forthe job of sailor, which requires strength and stamina); Guerriero v. Schultz, 557 F. Supp. 511 (D.D.C.
1983) (Complainant, who was an alchoholic with a schizoid personality, was not "otherwise qualified" be-
cause he required continued therapy in the United States, and therefore, could not meet the requirements
of a foreign service agent in spite of his handicap.).
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"affirmative efforts to overcome the disabilities caused by handicaps."62 Thus,
employers are not required to make substantial modifications to their programs.
Rather, section 504 requires only reasonable modification in existing programs
to accommodate handicapped persons. 63 The Court held that Davis was not
entitled to relief because her deafness, the handicap itself, would prevent her
from performing the duties imposed by the college's nursing program, and the
program could not be reasonably modified to accommodate her handicap.
64
In 1981 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided
the case of Doe v. New York University. 65 In Doe a woman was denied read-
mission into New York University's Medical School due to a history of psy-
chiatric "illness." Doe's second application was supported by an outstanding record
of employment and several favorable psychiatric evaluations. The court held,
however, that this evidence was not sufficient to offset the possibility that Doe's
past psychiatric condition could recur. The court, citing Davis, 66 stated that
an institution is not required to "make substantial modifications in its reasona-
ble standards or program to accomodate handicapped individuals but may take
an applicant's handicap into consideration, along with other relevant factors,
in determining whether she is qualified for admission."67 The court held that
the crucial question for section 504 analysis is not whether the handicap was
considered, but whether it provided a "reasonable basis for finding the plaintiff
not to be qualified or not as well qualified as other applicants."68
Two years later, in 1983, the Third Circuit decided Strathie v. Depart-
ment of Transportation. 69 The Strathie decision turned on the essential nature
of the job requirements. 70 The case involved a school bus driver whose state
62. Davis, 442 U.S. at 410. The Court found that section 504 did not mandate affirmative action, hold-
ing that "neither the language, purpose, nor history of section 504 reveals an intent to impose an affirmative-
action obligation on all recipients of federal funds." Id. at 411.
63. The Court stated:
We do not suggest that the line between a lawful refusal to extend affirmative action and illegal dis-
crimination against handicapped persons always will be clear. It is possible to envision situations
where an insistence on continuing past requirements and practices might arbitrarily deprive genuine-
ly qualified handicapped persons of the opportunity to participate in a covered program . . . . [S]itu-
ations may arise where a refusal to modify an existing program might become unreasonable and
discriminatory.
Id. at 412-13.
64. Id. at 415. Compare Norcross v. Sneed, 573 F. Supp. 533 (W.D. Ark. 1983) (school required to
make reasonable accomodations for a blind applicant for school librarian) with Upshur v. Love, 474 F. Supp.
332 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (school was not required to make accomodations for a blind applicant for a school
administrative position).
65. 666 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1981).
66. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
67. Doe, 666 F.2d at 775.
68. Id. at 776.
69. 716 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1983).
70. Id. at 230 n.5.
19881
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW [VoL. 9:181
license was suspended because he required the use of a hearing aid. 71 The court
noted that in order to determine whether Strathie was "otherwise qualified" to
be a bus driver, it must first ascertain the "essential nature" of the program. 72
The court rejected the Department of Transportation's argument that the pur-
pose of its licensing program was "to insure the highest level of safety. ''73 The
Strathie court held that the actual purpose of the program was more narrowly
confined "to prevent[ing] any and all appreciable risks that a school bus driver
will be unable to provide for the control over and the safety of his passengers."
74
The court noted that an individual would not be "otherwise qualified" if his or
her handicap would require "either a modification of the essential nature of the
program, or impose an undue burden on the recipient of federal funds."7  The
Third Circuit, applying this standard, held that Strathie's handicap did not render
him unqualified for the job. 76
In Alexander v. Choate77 the United States Supreme Court determined that
section 504 does not require federally funded programs to make substantial
modifications simply to "meet the reality that the handicapped have greater med-
ical needs."78 Section 504 seeks to assure evenhanded treatment and the op-
portunity for handicapped individuals to participate in and benefit from federally
assisted programs; however, the Act does not guarantee the handicapped in-
dividual equal results from the provision of state Medicaid. 79  The Court de-
71. The Court noted that:
In order to make out a case under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must prove (1)
that he is a "handicapped individual" under the Act, (2) that he is "otherwise qualified" for the posi-
tion sought, (3) that he was excluded from the position sought solely by reason of his handicap, and
(4) that the program or activity in question receives federal financial assistance.
Strathie, 716 F.2d at 230. See Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 774 (2d Cir. 1981).
72. Id. at 230. Additionally, a program must qualify as a recipient of federal funds for purposes of sec-
tion 504, regardless of whether any of the federal funding in question is earmarked for that program. The
court determined that the school bus driver licensing program in question did so qualify. Id. See Le Strange
v. Consolidated Rail Co., 687 F.2d 767 (3d Cir. 1982), affd, 465 U.S. 624 (1984). See also Grove City
College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684 (3d Cir. 1982), affd, 465 U.S. 555 (1984) (Title IX case).
73. Strathie, 716 F.2d at 232.
74. Id. (emphasis in original).
75. Id. at 231. See generally Gisler, Fair Employment and the Handicapped: A Legal Perspective, 27
DEPAUL L. REV. 953, 980-81 (1978) (discussing the ability of the physically and mentally handicapped to
perform adequate work despite their handicap). See Bentivegna v. United States Dep't of Labor, 694 F.2d
619, 623 (9th Cir. 1982) (The court held that "allowing remote concerns to legitimize discrimination against
the handicapped would vitiate the effectiveness of section 504 of the [Rehabilitation] Act."); New York State
Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 612 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1979) (school prevented, by section 504, from
excluding mentally retarded children who were thought to be hepatitis carriers, when the board was unable
to prove more than a remote possibility of a health hazard). But cf. Bey v. Bolger, 540 F. Supp. 910 (E. D.
Pa. 1982) (risk of stroke and heart attack associated with uncontrolled hypertension and cardiovascular dis-
ease sufficient basis to deny reemployment of former Postal Service clerk because he could not perform
the "essential functions" without endangering his health and safety).
76. Strathie, 716 F.2d at 232-34.
77. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
78. Id. at 303-04.
79. Id. at 304. Cf Doe v. Colautti, 592 F.2d 704 (3d Cir. 1979) (state may limit "covered-private-inpatient-
pyschiatric" care to 60 days even though state sets no limit on duration of coverage for physical illnesses).
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termined that section 504 does not require the recipients of federal funds to
make "broad-based distributive decision[s]" always in the manner most favora-
ble to the handicapped. To require such would "impose a virtually unworkable
requirement on state Medicaid administrators."
80
These cases, when taken together, indicate that whether an individual infected
with a contagious disease will be "otherwise qualified" must be determined on
a case-by-case basis. The deciding factor in each case is whether the individual
will be able to perform the required functions of the job as "reasonably" modi-
fied, in spite of the handicap. This determination must be made by weighing
the degree of debilitation experienced by the infected party against the job's
reasonably modified workload. Before an employer who receives federal fund-
ing may refuse to hire or may dismiss an employee as not "qualified," the em-
ployer must first determine whether reasonable accommodations could be made
to alleviate the impediment posed by the individual's handicap. The Arline de-
cision also requires that those reasonable accommodations be made. However,
the Court does not clarify what degree of modification is "reasonable." There-
fore, much future litigation as to contagious individuals may focus on the degree
of programmatic changes which employers will be required to make.
V. INSTANT CASE
In School Board of Nassau County, Florida v. Arline, 8 the United States
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a person afflicted with a conta-
gious disease is a "handicapped person" within the meaning of section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and, therefore, should be afforded the protection
of that statute. 82 In order to determine exactly what constitutes a "handicapped
individual," the Court looked primarily to two sources: the United States
Code 83 and the regulations promulgated by the Department of Health and Hu-
man Services. 8 4 To ascertain whether Arline should be regarded as a section
504 "handicapped individual," the Court reduced these regulations to their per-
tinent portions, and then fused the relevant sections into a working stan-
dard. 88 After placing Arline's medical history side by side with this frame of
reference, the Court decided that Arline had a physical impairment which sub-
80. Id. at 306-09.
81. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
82. Arline, 480 U.S. at 279-80.
83. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) defines a "handicapped individual" for use in section 504 as follows: "[A]ny
person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's
major life activities, (ii) has a record of such impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment."
Arline, 480 U.S. at 279.
84. These regulations define two critical terms used in the statutory definition of handicapped individu-
al. First, "physical impairment" is defined in relevant part as "any physiological disorder or condition ...
affecting ...[the] respiratory isystem]" and in addition, the regulation defines "major life activities" as "func-
tions such as ...working." Arline, 480 U.S. at 280.
85. Id. at 280-81.
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stantially interfered with one or more of her major life activities. 86 Due to her
"record of impairment," the Court labeled Arline a "handicapped individual."87
The school board argued that Arline's record of impairment was extraneous
in this case since she was dismissed solely to protect others from her ill health,
and not for any lack of physical competence . 8 The Court expressly rejected
this argument, stating: "[iut would be unfair to allow an employer to seize upon
the distinction between the effects of a disease on others and the effects of a
disease on a patient and use that distinction to justify discriminatory treatment."89
The Court bolstered this position by stating that section 504's basic pur-
pose is to guarantee that handicapped people are not discriminated against in
the job market.90 The Court noted that denying these individuals protection
from class prejudice merely preserves the archaic misapprehensions which fuel
this prejudice. 91 The Court concluded the issue by stating: "the fact that a per-
son with a record of a physical impairment is also contagious does not suffice
to remove that person from coverage under section 504."l'
The Supreme Court then attempted to ascertain whether Arline was "other-
wise qualified" to teach elementary school. 93 The Court, noting several basic
factors which must be utilized in conducting this inquiry, 94 concluded that "courts
normally should defer to the reasonable medical judgments of public health offi-
cials."9" Then, in light of the findings, the courts are to evaluate whether the
employer could "reasonably accommodate the employee under the established
standards for that inquiry."96 However, the Supreme Court determined that
the district court's findings were too incomplete to utilize these standards, and
the case was remanded for additional findings of fact.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented. Chief Justice
Rehnquist stated that the majority opinion ignored the previously established
principle that "where Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of
federal funds, 'it must do so unambiguously."' 9 7 Additionally, he noted that
the Nassau County School Board could not knowingly have accepted the fact
that receipt of their federal funds was conditioned on the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973. 98 Therefore, Justice Rehnquist concluded that the majority decision
86. Arline, 480 U.S. at 281.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 282.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 284.
92. Id. at 286.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 288. These basic factors include "(a) the nature of the risk ...(b) the duration of the risk
(c) the severity of the risk . . . and (d) the probabilities that the disease will be transmitted and will
cause varying degrees of harm." Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 289-90.
98. Id. at 293.
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rested not on the previously established case law, but on "their own sense of
fairness and implied support from the Act."99
VI. ANALYSIS
Arline set a helpful precedent for AIDS victims. The decision holds that
individuals infected with contagious diseases are "handicapped individuals" under
the Rehabilitation Act. Although the discussion of what constitutes an "other-
wise qualified" individual was not decided conclusively, the Arline Court indi-
cated that Arline would be "otherwise qualified" to teach if her disease was found
to pose no threat to her pupils. 100 Since medical knowledge to date indicates
that AIDS poses no serious threat of transmission through casual contact, AIDS
victims physically able to perform their work will find protection under the Re-
habilitation Act. The Arline decision thus promotes the purpose of the Act by
providing handicapped persons with legitimate employment opportunities. 101
It must be noted, however, that the Arline decision speaks only to the pro-
tection of individuals afflicted with tuberculosis. In order for the foregoing state-
ments to be legitimate, the Arline decision must be read broadly enough to provide
antidiscrimination protection to all contagious diseases. To predict whether Arline
will be applied to AIDS, it must first be determined whether the two diseases
have a similar epidemiological basis. Therefore, this analysis will begin with
a comparison of the two diseases.
A. Tuberculosis v. AIDS
Tuberculosis, or as it was once known, the White Plague, is caused by
a microorganism known as Mycobacterium tuberculosis. 102 The bacterium is
most commonly found in the lungs. 103
Tuberculosis is transmitted through the sputum, either in airborne droplets
through activities such as speaking, coughing, singing, or laughing. 104 The
degree of contagion varies according to the concentration of bacterium in the
sputum. Although more than one-fourth of the population harbors tubercle bacilli,
the number of people who actually manifest symptoms of the disease is rela-
tively small. 105 Prior to the 1924 discovery of a vaccine for individuals ex-
99. Id. at 289.
100. Comment, Recent Developments: Public Health and Employment Issues Generated by the AIDS Cri-
sis, 25 WASHBURN L.J. 505, 530 (1986).
101. id. at 530 n.222. The purpose of the Rehabilitation Act was to promote and expand employment
opportunities for handicapped persons and provide handicapped people the opportunity to live rehabilitated
and independent lives. See 29 U.S.C. § 701(8) (1982).
102. G. TORTORA & N. ANAGNOSTAKOS, PRINCIPLES OF ANATOMY AND PHYSIOLOGY 590 (3d ed. 1981).
103. Id.
104. WEINBERGER, PRINCIPLES OF PULMONARY MEDICINE 272 (1986).
105. Id. at 273.
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posed to tuberculosis, there was no prevention and no cure; the victims of the
disease were merely isolated in sanatoriums. In 1944, the first chemotherapeu-
tic agent for the treatment of tuberculosis was invented. 106 Today, many drugs
are known to be available for treatment of the disease. Accordingly, the num-
ber of reported deaths from tuberculosis in the United States has dropped from
202 per 100,000 population in 1900 to about 0.8 per 100,000 in 1981. 107
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) is a virus which attacks
the human body's immune system, rendering the afflicted individual vulnera-
ble to the attack of certain "opportunistic" infections. 108 The AIDS virus is con-
tracted through exposure to the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). 109 Al-
though medical knowledge concerning the disease is limited, it has been deter-
mined that the virus may be transmitted through sexual relations, intravenous
blood transfusions, needle sharing among drug users, and other direct contact
with infected blood. 10 Researchers currently believe that the AIDS virus can-
not be contracted through casual contact. I
Recent medical research has determined that HIV can be divided into several
categories based on clinical manifestations. 112 These categories cover a wide
spectrum of manifestations ranging from asymptomatic to fatal. 1 13 The first
category to be discussed is that of the healthy asymptomatic individual. The
presence of HIV antibodies in an individual does not necessarily indicate that
the individual will acquire AIDS. 114 Thus, the term "carrier" has been applied
to indicate that although the individual may carry the disease to another per-
son, the carrier may remain healthy and unaffected by the virus. 11 I The next
few categories include a wide range of manifestations from nonspecific
mononucleosis-like symptoms to more severe "prodromal" infections, which
106. Id. at 276.
107. E. WOLINSKY, TEXTBOOK OF PULMONARY DISEASES 507 (3d ed. 1983).
108. Id. at 508. "Opportunistic 'pathogens' [infections] are generally harmless in their normal habitat until
they gain access to other sites or tissues." Once this occurs they can cause a variety of diseases. M. PELC-
ZAR, JR., R. REID & E. CHAN, MICROBIOLOGY 604 (4th ed. 1977).
109. Fisher, AIDS Update, 35 HENRY FORD Hosp. MED. 1. 5 (1987) [hereinafter Fisher].
110. Id. at 7-9.
111. THE MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY 288-89 (R. Berkow, M.D. 15th ed. 1987) [here-
inafter MERCK MANUAL].
112. Fisher, supra note 109, at 11. "The Center For Disease Control (CDC) terms interaction with fami-
ly, close friends, and co-workers as 'casual contact,' but actually means intimate contact short of sexual rela-
tions." Id. at 8.
113. Fisher, supra note 109, at 11.
114. See generally Comment, The Developing Law on Aids in the Workplace, 46 MD. L. REV. 284 (1987)
(discussion of the available medical facts about AIDS and the major legal issues those facts raise for employ-
ers); Comment, AIDS: Does it Qualify as a "Handicap" Under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973?, 61 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 572 (1986) (discussing whether courts should consider AIDS victims and those erroneously
believed to be AIDS victims as "handicapped individuals" under the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973);
Fuchsberg, Law, Social Policy, and Contagious Disease: A Symposium On Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS), 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1985) (a summary of the nature and effects of AIDS).
115. Fisher, supra note 109, at 11.
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indicate a high risk of progression to "full-blown" AIDS. 116 The last category
is that of full-blown AIDS.
Symptoms associated with AIDS include persistent fever, dramatic weight
loss, fatigue, diarrhea, and swollen lymph glands. 117 The period during which
the individual will exhibit symptoms may vary from one week to seven years
or more. 118 Although the virus ultimately proves fatal, the victim usually does
not die of AIDS but rather from one of the aforementioned opportunistic
infections - most commonly, cancer or pneumonia. 119 From a physiological
point of view, there are several similarities between AIDS and tuberculosis. 120
The most important of these similarities, for our purposes, is that both diseases
are contagious. From an employment standpoint, however, tuberculosis is the
easier of the two to contract.
B. Will Arline Be Applied To AIDS?
Arline holds that a person with a "record of a physical impairment" who
is also contagious will be protected from employment discrimination under section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Justice Brennan, speaking for the majority, stat-
ed that the 1974 amendments to the Rehabilitation Act, which extended cover-
age to individuals simply "regarded as having" a physical or mental impairment,
revealed that Congress was "as concerned about the effect of the impairment
on others as it was about its effect on the individual." 2 ' The Court further
noted that the legislative history of the Act demonstrated that its framers in-
tended to protect individuals with impairments that "might not diminish a per-
son's physical or mental capabilities, but could nevertheless substantially limit
that person's ability to work as a result of the negative reaction of others to
the impairment."122 The Court concluded that allowing discrimination due to
possible contagion would be permitting "discrimination on the basis of





119. Fisher, supra note 109, at 11-12.
120. "The rate of tuberculosis in this country has begun to increase in the risk groups associated with
AIDS. A connection between the two diseases is suspected, but more research is needed to determine whether
this development is more than coincidence." Note, AIDS and Employment Discrimination Under the Federal
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and Virginia's Rights of Persons With Disabilities Act, 20 U. RICH. L. REV. 425,
443 n. 127 (1986); see generally Williams, Tuberculosis Rise Among AIDS Raises Concern About Wider TB
Infection, Wall St. J., Mar. 13, 1986, at 53, col. 3 (discussion of the increasing number of AIDS victims
which are being secondarily infected with tuberculosis).
121. Arline, 480 U.S. at 282.
122. Id. at 282-83. See Comment, Employment Rights Of Handicapped Individuals: Statutory And Judi-
cial Parameters, 20 WM. & MARY L. REV. 291 (1978) ("The most significant restriction on the statutory
definition of handicapped is the phrase 'substantially limits'; the precise meaning of this phrase remains
unclear.").
123. Arline, 480 U.S. at 284.
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A strict reading of the Arline decision, coupled with the similarities be-
tween AIDS and tuberculosis, leads one to conclude that AIDS victims are "han-
dicapped individuals" and therefore will be protected from employment
discrimination. However, the risk of contagion might still be viewed as a major
obstacle in any attempt to classify AIDS as a protected handicap. At the time
the Arline decision was rendered, tuberculosis was no longer the feared disease
that it had once been. Tuberculosis has been substantially controlled, and deaths
from the disease are now very rare. It is fair to assume that had Arline been
brought before the Supreme Court in the early part of this century, when tuber-
culosis was as sinister as AIDS is today, the decision may have been quite differ-
ent. There is also a major distinction between the two diseases-tuberculosis
may be controlled or even prevented by use of available medication; whereas,
AIDS is almost always fatal. In addition, there is very little medical knowledge
about the transmission of the AIDS virus. As a result of the lack of sufficient
medical knowledge, much of the general public has either been misinformed
or not informed at all about the causes and effects of the disease. Throughout
history, people have feared and scorned that which is unknown. AIDS is no
exception. The Arline Court aptly stated that "Congress acknowledged that so-
ciety's accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease are as han-
dicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual impairment. Few
aspects of a handicap give rise to the same level of public fear and misappre-
hension as contagiousness." '124
The Arline Court appeared to purposefully overextend the discussion neces-
sary to resolve the immediate case. Arline was a teacher with a record of phys-
ical impairment. This fact alone should have been a sufficient basis to determine
that Arline was a "handicapped individual" under the Rehabilitation Act. Yet,
the Court devoted a substantial portion of the opinion to the determination of
whether fear of contagion alone is sufficient to render an individual handicapped.
The Court seemed to lay a foundation for inevitable AIDS-related litigation.
The Supreme Court did, however, expressly reserve the issue of whether "a
carrier of a contagious disease such as AIDS . . . could be considered, solely
on the basis of contagiousness, a handicapped person as defined by the Act." 125
Although the Court stated explicitly that it was not deciding this issue, one can
arguably assume that it was at least providing some future guidance for AIDS
litigation. Interpreted either way, this reservation may have very significant
implications for victims of AIDS, and in particular for those individuals who
are carriers. The health of an AIDS victim who has experienced the debilitat-
ing effects of the disease tends to decline very rapidly, 126 possibly rendering
124. Id. See generally Note, Facial Discrimination: Extending Handicap Law To Employment Discrimi-
nation On The Basis Of Physical Appearance, 100 HARV. L. REV. 2035 (1987).
125. Arline, 480 U.S. at 282 n.7.
126. See generally Leonard, Employment Discrimination Against Persons With AIDS, 10 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 681 (1985) (discussing facts about AIDS as they relate to employment rights).
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the individual unqualified to perform various jobs. On the other hand, an in-
dividual who is merely a carrier 27 of the disease may never experience any
physically disabling effects and may remain able to function effectively while
being seriously harmed by stigmatization. Therefore, unless Arline is applied
evenly to all AIDS victims, the decision will ring hollow for those individuals
who, though not physically impaired, are handicapped only by the perception
of others.
C. Are AIDS Victims "Otherwise Qualified"?
Although the Arline Court implied that if Arline's disease posed no threat
to her students she would be "otherwise qualified" to teach, it did not expressly
announce what constitutes an "otherwise qualified" individual. There were,
however, several guidelines which the Court stated would be utilized in such
a determination. The health and safety risks which contagious individuals pose
to employers and co-workers was noted as an important consideration. 128 In
order to draw a conclusion about the degree of risk presented by a particular
contagious illness, "courts ordinarily should defer to the reasonable medical
judgement of public health officials." 129 Since current medical knowledge in-
dicates that AIDS may not be transmitted through the casual interaction which
occurs in the ordinary employment setting, AIDS victims are likely to be regarded
as "otherwise qualified" under this element of the Arline standard.
The next inquiry which must be performed is whether an employer could
make reasonable accommodations in their existing programs to eliminate any
health or safety risk found to exist. The Court stated that "[allthough [employ-
ers] are not required to find another job for an employee who is not qualified
for the job he or she was doing, they cannot deny an employee alternative
employment opportunities reasonably available under the employer's existing
policies." 3' Due to the negligible risk of AIDS transmission in the workplace,
victims of the disease who are physically able to perform the job requirements
should be relatively easy to "reasonably accommodate." However, before con-
cluding that AIDS victims will be "otherwise qualified," it is worth mentioning
that, although AIDS may not render the infected person as not "otherwise quali-
127. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
128. Arline, 480 U.S. at 228.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 289 n.19. See also Stutts v. Freeman, 694 F.2d 666 (11th Cir. 1983) (Where an employer
had information showing that a job applicant was able to perform the necessary work despite his handicap,
the court held employer had failed to reasonably accommodate the applicant by rejecting him solely on the
basis of a written general aptitude test.); Trimble v. Carlin, 633 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (postal wor-
ker who became handicapped as a cumulative result of injuries to his right knee was an "otherwise qualified
handicapped person" requiring employer to make reasonable accomodations). Contra Vickers v. Veterans
Admin., 549 F. Supp. 85 (W.D. Wash. 1982) (employer was not under a duty to make "reasonable accom-
modations" to an employee's hypersensitivity to tobacco smoke, even though employee was a "handicapped
individual" within the Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
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fled," one of the opportunistic infections might. Because an AIDS victim's im-
mune system is compromised, the chance of contracting other infectious diseases
is quite possible. Therefore, if an AIDS victim contracts, for instance, active
tuberculosis, and cannot be reasonably accommodated to decrease the health
risks to fellow employees, that individual would not be "otherwise qualified"
under the Arline standard. It appears that in most situations, however, employ-
ers will not be able to hide behind the "otherwise qualified" requirement of the
Rehabilitation Act in an attempt to deny AIDS victims employment.
D. Judicial Interpretations
The United States Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of whether
an AIDS victim can meet the Rehabilitation Act's requirements necessary to
afford them protection from employment discrimination. However, several fed-
eral courts have recently addressed this precise issue.
In 1987, a United States District Court granted a permanent injunction pro-
hibiting a school district from excluding a child infected with AIDS from at-
tending regular kindergarten classes. In Thomas v. Atascadero Unified School
District, the court held that a child infected with the virus was an "otherwise
qualified handicapped individual" within the meaning of section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. '3 The court reasoned that AIDS victims suffer
significant impairments of their major life activities as defined by HHS, and
noted that even those AIDS victims who are asymptomatic "have abnormalities
in their hemic and reproductive systems .... 1 32 The Thomas court, relying
on reports from the Centers on Disease Control, concluded that "[t]he best avail-
able medical evidence shows that the AIDS virus is not spread in the air by
infected droplets as are the common cold, influenza and tuberculosis."
1 33
Subsequently, in 1988, in Chalk v. United States District Court Central
District of California, the Ninth Circuit granted a preliminary injunction pro-
hibiting the Department of Education from reassigning a teacher, diagnosed
as having AIDS, to an administrative position. 134 The court, relying exten-
sively on Arline, placed significant weight on the fact that medical research over-
whelmingly indicates that AIDS poses no serious threat of transmission through
casual contact. 135 The court held that Chalk did not have to disprove every
theoretical possibility of harm, but only had to show that there was no "signifi-
131. 662 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
132. Id. at 379. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
133. Id. at 380. See Board of Educ. v. Cooperman, 105 N.J. 587, 523 A.2d 655 (1987) (The court, without
expressly deciding the issue, noted that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Arline suggested that
the Rehabilitation Act could be relevant to the exclusion of AIDS infected children from public schools.).
134. 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988).
135. Id. at 708.
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cant risk of communicating [the] infectious disease to others." 13 1 In addition,
the Chalk court, again quoting liberally from Arline, noted that the possibility
that Chalk's return to the classroom would be met with public disapproval was
not a sufficient reason to deny the injunction. 137
Not all federal cases have held in favor of AIDS victims. In Local 1812,
American Federation of Goverment Employees v. United States Department of
State, the court denied such an individual a preliminary injunction. 38 In Lo-
cal 1812, a union, representing some of its members, sought to enjoin the Depart-
ment of State from requiring mandatory AIDS testing for foreign service
positions. The court held that AIDS victims, even carriers, were handicapped
individuals under the Rehabilitation Act. 139 However, the decision turned on
the "otherwise qualified" language, with the court holding that AIDS-infected
persons were not qualified for worldwide foreign service duty. 140 The court
stated that "the record is devoid of any purpose or intention to discriminate.
The present record discloses sufficient prospect of serious harm to the Depart-
ment of State's mission and to its employees to warrant continued testing and
consequent limitation on assignment or hiring." 14' It is important to note that
the court considered the fact that in foreign posts, where these employees would
be assigned, there was insufficient medical technology to properly care for AIDS
victims.
These cases indicate the federal courts acquiesce to the Arline conclusion
that contagious disease victims are "handicapped individuals" under the Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973. Furthermore, in the majority of situations, AIDS victims
will also be "otherwise qualified."
VII. CONCLUSION
The evidence examined indicates that the Arline decision and the Rehabili-
tation Act both support the conclusion that the majority of AIDS workers should
be able to find legal shelter under the Act. The debilitating effects of the dis-
ease indicate that it is a "physical or mental impairment which substantially limits
one or more of such person's major life activities." 4 2 Furthermore, the legis-
lative history indicates that the statute was intended to be read broadly enough
to encompass those handicapped individuals experiencing employment discrimi-
nation.
Thomas Michael Louis
136. Id. at 708.
137. Id. at 710-12.
138. 662 F. Supp. 50 (D.D.C. 1987).
139. Id. at 54.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See supra note 26.
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